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Intrarailroad and Intermodal Competition 
Impacts on Railroad Wheat Rates
by Michael W. Babcock and Bebonchu Atems
The issue addressed in this paper is more fully understanding the relationship of intrarailroad 
competition and rail rates for wheat in the largest wheat producing states, which are Idaho, Kansas, 
Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington. The overall 
objective of the study is to investigate railroad pricing behavior for wheat shipments. The rate model 
was	estimated	with	OLS	 in	double-log	 specification	utilizing	 the	2012	STB	Confidential	Waybill	
sample and other data.
The research found that the distance from origin to destination and the total shipment weight 
had	the	expected	negative	relationships	with	railroad	wheat	rates	and	were	statistically	significant.	
The distance from origin to the nearest barge loading location had the expected positive relationship 
to	railroad	wheat	rates	and	was	also	significant.	The	weight	of	each	covered	hopper	car	and	the	
Herfindahl-Hirschman	 Index	 were	 both	 non-significant.	 However,	 the	 study	 used	 other	 data	 to	
determine that intrarailroad competition for wheat shipments within states appears to be present in 
most states.
INTRODUCTION
Railroads were the most heavily regulated transportation mode prior to passage of the Staggers 
Rail Act in 1980.  Deregulation gave the railroads price flexibility that was previously unavailable. 
Prices between variable cost and 180% of variable cost were not subject to regulatory review.  The 
Staggers Act set time limits for ICC decisions regarding abandonments and mergers. Thus, Class 
I railroads were able to quickly abandon or sell unprofitable branch lines.  Mergers reduced the 
number of Class I railroads from 40 in 1980 to seven today.
Generally, deregulation has benefited both the railroads and the shippers. For the railroad 
industry, the average rate of return on investment increased from less than 3% in the 1970s to 4.4% 
for the 1980s, 7.64% in the 1990s, and 8.21% in the 2000s (Association of American Railroads 
[AAR], various years). For the 2010 to 2013 period, the rate of return on investment averaged 
12.09% (AAR 2014). The average railroad rate of return on shareholders’ equity rose from 2.44% in 
the 1970s to 7.37% in the 1980s, 9.51% in the 1990s, and 9.38% in the 2000s (AAR, various years). 
For the 2010-2013 period, the rate of return on shareholders’ equity averaged 13.94% (AAR 2014).
Gallamore (1999) analyzed the relationship between deregulation and innovation in the rail 
industry.  Using a before-and-after analysis, he pointed out that railroads stagnated under the final 
decades of ICC regulation but have significantly recovered as indicated above by the improved 
financial performance after 1980.
According to Grimm and Winston (2000), the net annual benefits to shippers were more than 
$12 billion (in 1999 dollars) in the first decade following passage of the Staggers Act.  Shippers have 
benefited from 20 years of declining rail rates (inflation adjusted revenue per ton-mile) as well as the 
preservation of rural area branch lines sold or leased to short line railroads (Prater 2010).
Railroads are important for transporting agricultural commodities to domestic processing 
locations and export ports. These shipments involve large scale movements of low value, bulk 
commodities over long distances. Compared with other major grains (and soybeans), railroads are 
a particularly valuable mode for transporting wheat, moving 51% of all wheat shipments in 2013 
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(Sparger and Marathon 2015). According to Prater (2010), nine of the top 10 wheat producing 
states are more than 150 miles from barge transportation on the Mississippi River, which provides 
the most significant intermodal competition to railroads for long distance shipments of grain to 
export ports.  Wheat shippers in the Great Plains states do not have a cost effective transportation 
alternative to railroads since barge loading locations are not directly accessible, and trucks are not 
competitive for hauling shipments over long distances. Therefore, intramodal competition for wheat 
shipments is expected to be a significant factor in rail rates.  Table 1 contains Class I railroad route 
mileage for the nine major wheat producing states in 2013.
The data in Table 1 indicate the railroad mileage of some states is dominated by a single Class I 
railroad.  For example, 88.1% of the rail miles in Idaho are UP miles.  The BNSF has 94.1% of the 
Montana rail miles, 78.1% of the North Dakota miles, and 75.4% of the Washington miles.  These 
states all have regional and local railroads that act as bridge carriers for the Class I railroads and, as 
such, they provide little direct intrarailroad competition.  However, depending on the state railroad 
network, non-Class I railroads may contribute to intrarailroad competition.
Unlike Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, and other states are characterized by a Class I duopoly 
of roughly equal size firms. For example, in Kansas the BNSF has 44.3% of the Class I rail miles 
and the UP has 55%.  In Minnesota the BNSF has 36.4% and the CP (Canadian Pacific) has 38.9% 
of the state’s rail miles. In Oklahoma the BNSF and UP have 43.9% and 49.7% of the Class I rail 
miles, respectively.  The BNSF and UP have respective shares of 40.5% and 52% of Texas Class I 
miles.  This group of states would be expected to have lower rail wheat rates than the previous group 
due to greater intrarailroad competition. The degree of intrarailroad competition varies among states 
as should the level of railroad wheat prices. Potentially, intrarailroad competition could vary within 
states as well.
The overall objective of this research is to investigate 2012 railroad pricing behavior for the 
shipment of wheat. Specific objectives include: (1) measure the impact on railroad wheat rates 
of the intensity of intramodal competition, (2) develop a model to measure the impact of railroad 
costs, intramodal competition, and intermodal competition on rail wheat rates in the nine major 
wheat production states, (3) identify and measure the major cost determinates of railroad wheat 
rates, and (4) examine the hypothesis that railroad intramodal competition varies within a state with 
implications for intrastate variation in railroad wheat rates.
WHEAT PRODUCING STATE RAIL SYSTEMS
Tables 2-10 contain the railroad route mileage of nine states by class of railroad. Idaho has two 
Class I railroads, but the UP has 88.1% of the Class I miles. Idaho also has 10 Class III railroads, 
which collectively account for 714 miles for 41.7% of total Idaho rail miles.1  However, Idaho has 
no CRDs (Crop Reporting Districts) for wheat that are served by at least two Class I railroads.
Table 3 contains Kansas rail mileage, with BNSF and UP accounting for the great majority of 
Class I miles. Kansas has 11 Class II and III railroads, which as a group account for 40.5% of Kansas 
railroad mileage.
Table 4 indicates that Minnesota has more Class I rail mileage than non-Class I. CP and BNSF 
are the dominant Class I railroads, but UP and CN (Canadian National) have significant track 
mileage as well. Minnesota has 10 Class II and III railroads, which account for only 17% of the total 
Minnesota rail system.
As indicated by the data in Table 5, the BNSF is the dominant railroad in Montana, accounting 
for 63.2% of the Montana rail network. Montana has two Class II and three Class III railroads that 
as a group account for 36.8% of total Montana rail miles.
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Table 6 reveals that BNSF is the dominant Class I railroad in North Dakota, but CP has about 
500 miles as well. North Dakota has two Class II and two Class III railroads that collectively 
constitutes 35.4% of the North Dakota rail system.
Table 7 indicates that Oklahoma has two Class I railroads (BNSF and UP) of roughly equal size. 
Oklahoma has more (18) Class III railroads than any of the other eight states (except Washington, 
which also has 18) and account for 35.1% of the Oklahoma railroad network.
Table 8 reveals that South Dakota has two Class I railroads, with BNSF accounting for about 
60% of the Class I miles and UP the other 40% of the South Dakota rail system. South Dakota has 
seven Class III railroads, which account for 19.5% of the South Dakota railroad network.
Texas has significantly more rail miles than any of the other eight states (Table 9). UP has 
52% of the Class I rail miles, followed by BNSF (40.5%) and KCS (7.5%). Texas has two Class II 
railroads and eight Class III railroads that together accounty for 12.8% of the Texas railroad system.
Table 10 displays Washington rail miles, which indicate that the BNSF is the dominant Class I 
railroad in Washington with 75% of the rail miles; UP accounting for the remaining 25%.  Washington 
has 18 Class III railroads, accounting for 35.9% of the Washington railroad network.
Table 2:  Idaho Railroad Mileage by Class of Railroad, 2013
Class I Miles
Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) 118
Union Pacific (UP) 877
Subtotal 995
Local Railroads (Class III)  
Montana Rail Link 33.5
Bountiful Grain and Craig Mountain 126.6
St Maries River 72.3
Boise Valley 42.1
Eastern Idaho 264.5
Great Northwest 4.3
Idaho Northern Pacific 101.3
Pend Oreille Valley 25.7
Washington and Idaho 19.1
U.G. Government 24.3
Subtotal 714
Grand Total 1709
Source: 2013 Idaho Statewide Rail Plan. Idaho Department of Transportation.
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Table 3: Kansas Railroad Mileage by Class of Railroad, 2013
Class I Miles
Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) 1,237
Union Pacific (UP) 1,535
Kansas City Southern (KCS) 18
Subtotal 2,790
Regional Railroads (Class II)
Kansas and Oklahoma Railroad 753
Local Railroads (Class III)
South Kansas and Oklahoma Railroad 305
KYLE Railroad 417
Cimarron Valley Railroad 183
Nebraska, Kansas, and Colorado Railroad 122
Garden City Western Railroad 45
V&S Railway 25
Blackwell Northern Gateway Railroad 18
Blue Rapids Railroad 10
Boothill and Western Railroad 10
Missouri and Northern Arkansas Railroad 8
Subtotal 1,143
Grand Total 4,686
Source: 2011 Kansas Statewide Rail Plan.  Kansas Department of Transportation, pp. 40 and 52.
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Table 4: Minnesota Railroad Mileage by Class of Railroad, 2013
Class I Miles
Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) 1,686
Union Pacific (UP) 665
Canadian National (CN) 479
Canadian Pacific (CP) 1804
Subtotal 4,634
Regional & Local Railroads (Class II & Class III)  
Minnesota Northern Railroad 257
Twin Cities and Western Railroad 234
Progressive Rail Inc. 97
Minnesota Prairie Line 94
Otter Tail Valley Railroad 72
St Croix Valley Railroad 66
Northern Plains Railroad 51
Minnesota Southern Railroad 42
Red River Valley and Western 32
Minnesota, Dakota and Western 6
Subtotal 951
Grand Total 5,585
Source: 2014 Minnesota Statewide Rail Plan, Minnesota Department of Transportation, 2014.
Table 5: Montana Railroad Mileage by Class of Railroad, 2013
Class I Miles
Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) 1,939
Union Pacific (UP) 125
Subtotal 2,064
Regional Railroads (Class II)  
Montana Rail Link 475
Dakota, Missouri Valley and Western 540
Subtotal 1,015
Local Railroads (Class III)  
Central Montana Rail Line 84
Mission Mountain Railroad 42
Butte, Anaconda and Pacific Railroad 63
Subtotal 189
Grand Total 3,268
Source: Montana State Department of Transportation, 2014.
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Table 6: North Dakota Railroad Mileage by Class of Railroad, 2013
Class I Miles
Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) 1,700
Canadian Pacific (CP) 484
Subtotal 2,184
Regional Railroads (Class II)  
Dakota, Missouri Valley and Western Railroad 424
Red River Valley and Western Railroad 427
Subtotal 851
Local Railroads (Class III)  
Northern Plains Railroad 297
Dakota Northern Railroad 48
Subtotal 345
Grand Total 3,380
Source: North Dakota Public Service Commission, 2013 Annual Report.
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Table 7: Oklahoma Railroad Mileage by Class of Railroad, 2013
Class I Miles
Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) 1,037
Union Pacific (UP) 1,173
Kansas City Southern (KCS) 150
Subtotal 2,360
Local Railroads (Class III)  
South Kansas and Oklahoma Railroad 275
Grainbelt Corportation 176
Kiamichi Corportation 158
Arkansas-Oklahoma Railroad 118
Farmrail Corporation 161
Wichita, Tillman and Jackson Railroad 85
South Kansas and Oklahoma Railroad 67
Arkansas, Todd and Ladd Railroad 47
Texas, Oklahoma, and Eastern 41
Blackwell Northern Gateway Railroad 18
Cimarron Valley Railroad 35
Tulsa-Supulpa Union Railroad 23
Sand Springs Railroad 20
Tulsa Port of Catoosa 16
Western Farmers Electric Coop Railway 14
Public Service of Oklahoma Railroad 10
Northwestern Oklahoma Railroad 5
Port of Muscoge Railroad 5
Subtotal 1,274
Grand Total 3,634
Source: Oklahoma Statewide Freight and Passenger Rail Plan, Oklahoma Department 
of Transportation, 2014.
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Table 8: South Dakota Railroad Mileage by Class of Railroad, 2013
Class I Miles
Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) 889
Canadian Pacific (CP) 598
Subtotal 1,487
Local Railroads (Class III)  
D&I Railroad 54.2
Dakota, Missouri Valley, Western Railroad 56.4
Dakota Southern Railroad 168.5
Sisseton Milbank Railroad 37.1
Sunflour Railroad 19.4
Ellis and Eastern Railroad 14.3
Twin Cities and Western Railroad 10.7
Subtotal 361
Grand Total 1,848
Source: 2014 South Dakota Statewide Railroad Plan, South Dakota Department of  
Transportation.
Table 9: Texas Railroad Mileage by Class of Railroad, 2013
Class I Miles
Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) 4,929
Union Pacific (UP) 6,336
Kansas City Southern (KCS) 908
Subtotal 12,173
Regional Railroads (Class II)  
Texas Northeastern Railroad 665
Texas Pacifico Transportation 391
Subtotal 1,056
Local Railroads (Class III)  
Fort Worth and Western Railroad 276
West Texas and Lubbock Railroad 107
Texas Northeastern Railroad 104
Blacklands Railroad 66
Farmrail Corp. Railroad 59
Brownsville and Rio Grande Railroad 42
Kiamichi Railroad 40
Georgetown Railroad 30
Subtotal 724
Grand Total 13,953
Source: Texas Department of Transportation.
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Table 10: Washington Railroad Mileage by Class of Railroad, 2013
Class I Miles
Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) 1,633
Union Pacific (UP) 532
Subtotal 2,165
Local Railroads (Class III)  
Palouse River and Coulee City Railroad 169
Cascade and Columbia River Railroad 148
Kettle Falls International Railroad 142
Eastern Washington Gateway Railroad 108
Puget Sound and Pacific Railroad 108
Washington and Idaho Railroad 87
Columbia Basin Railroad 86
Central Washington Railroad 80
Great Northwest Railroad 69
Port of Pend Oreille Railroad 61
Portland, Vancouver, Junction Railroad 33
Patriot Woods Railroad 29
Royal Slope Line 26
Yakima Central Railroad 21
Western Washington Railroad 18
Port of Seattle Railroad 11
Port of Chehalis Railroad 10
Columbia and Cowlitz Railroad 9
Subtotal 1,215
Grand Total 3,380
Source: Washington Department of Transportation.
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STATE WHEAT PRODUCTION
Table 11 contains average annual wheat production for each of the nine states during the 2009-2013 
period. Kansas, North Dakota, Montana, and Washington had the largest production with 341.5, 
310.2, 193, and 146.2 million bushels, respectively. Collectively, the nine states averaged 1,463.3 
million bushels of wheat per year.
Table 11: Total Average Wheat Production, 2009-2013
    (Thousands of Bushels)
State Average 
Production
Production 
Rank
Idaho       103,654 7
Kansas       341,500 1
Minnesota         75,438 9
Montana       192,953 3
North Dakota       310,186 2
Oklahoma       105,459 6
South Dakota       107,270 5
Texas         80,460 8
Washington       146,200 4
Total     1,463,310 
Source: US Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service
Wheat production data indicate likely origin areas for rail wheat shipments. Total annual wheat 
production varies greatly in all nine states. For example, total Idaho wheat production increased 
by 18.2% between 2009 and 2011, before plunging 16.3% in 2012 (relative to 2011) and then 
recovering by 6.7% in 2013 (relative to 2012).  Idaho wheat production is concentrated in the North 
and East CRDs.
Since Kansas is the leading producer of wheat in the U.S., it has significant production 
throughout the western two-thirds of the state. However, the Central and South Central CRDs have 
the largest wheat production in the state. Total Kansas wheat output fell 25.2% between 2009 and 
2011, rose 38.2% in 2012, and then fell by 16.5% in 2013.
Montana wheat production is concentrated in the North Central and Northeast CRDs, accounting 
for, on average, 77.2% of total state output.  Total Montana wheat production displayed an “up, then 
down” pattern.  Production rose 21.9% from 2009 to 2010, then fell 18.8% in 2011, followed by an 
11.3% gain in 2012 and a 4.2% increase in 2013.
North Dakota has wheat production in all nine of its CRDs. However, the Northwest plus the 
Northeast districts, on average, account for 38.7% of the state’s wheat production. Total North 
Dakota wheat output plummeted 46.9% between 2009 and 2011, soared 69.7% in 2012, but then in 
2013 declined 19.2% to its lowest level of the five-year period.
Oklahoma wheat production is concentrated in the West Central, Southwest, and North Central 
CRDs, which account for 72.6% of average Oklahoma wheat output. Total Oklahoma wheat 
production increased 59.5% in 2010 (relative to 2009), then dropped by 41.8% in 2011. Production 
in 2012 more than doubled the 2011 production, increasing by 119.9%, but declined in 2013 by 
31.9%.
Average wheat production in South Dakota is concentrated in the Central and North Central 
CRDs, accounting for about 46% of total output. Total production declined 18.9% between 2009 
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and 2011, and fell another 26% between 2011 and 2013. Wheat production in 2013 was only 60% 
of the 2009 output.
Texas wheat production, on average, is concentrated in the Northern High Plains and the 
Blacklands CRDs, which account for 59.2% of Texas output. Total production rose 108.2% in 2010 
compared with the depressed production of 2009. Production in 2011 decreased 61.3%, rose 94.3% 
in 2012, and then declined by 29% in 2013.
Washington wheat production is located almost entirely in the East Central and Southeast 
CRDs, which together constitute 86% of average wheat output. Total production increased 36.4% 
between 2009 and 2011 and then declined by about 13% in both 2012 and 2013.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Numerous studies have examined the relationship of railroad industry competition and rail pricing 
in agricultural markets. Many of the previous studies investigated the impact of deregulation after 
the passage of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980. A significant amount of the literature is regional in 
scope motivated by the fact that regional railroad networks vary, resulting in regional variation in 
intrarailroad and intermodal competition.
Several studies analyzed changes in intramodal competition and rail prices in grain transport 
following passage of the Staggers Act of 1980.  These include Adam and Anderson (1985), Babcock 
et al. (1985), Chow (1986), Fuller et al. (1987), and MacDonald (1987) (1989a) and (1989b).  In 
general, these studies found that rail wheat rates declined in nearly all corridors in the 1981-1985 
period.  Grain rates on movements by rail to the Great Lakes, Gulf of Mexico, and the Pacific Coast 
declined by large percentages.
Wilson and Wilson (2001) documented the rail rate changes that occurred as a result of 
deregulation in the 1972-1995 period. They use a nonlinear regulatory adjustment mechanism to 
represent the annual effects of deregulation over time and saw that the largest effects occurred 
shortly after deregulation. Over time, the total effects of deregulation continue to reduce rail rates 
but at a slower rate.
Wilson and Wilson found that in 1981, the effect on rail rates of the Staggers Act was a decrease 
of 10.6%, 9.9%, 1.8%, 13.7%, and 8.4% for barley, corn, sorghum, wheat, and soybeans, respectively. 
These initial effects grew over time at a decreasing rate.  By 1995, the long-term percent reduction in 
rail rates resulting from deregulation was 52%, 46%, 55%, 52%, and 42% for barley, corn, sorghum, 
wheat, and soybeans, respectively. Thus, rail deregulation had relatively small initial effects on rail 
rates but eventually developed into larger long-term effects.
Harbor (2008) took a comprehensive look at competition within the U.S. railroad industry. She 
found that the further a shipment originates from water competition, the higher the rail rates. For 
instance, corn shippers located 100 miles from a barge loading point pay 18.5% higher rates than 
those located 50 miles from water. Soybean shippers located 100 miles from water have rail rates 
13.4% higher than shipments originating 50 miles from barge loading points.
Harbor (2008) concludes that a movement from a monopoly to a duopoly causes corn rail rates 
to decline by 23.1% at 25 miles from water, 16% at 50 miles away, and 9.6% at 100 miles from 
water.  She also found that a movement from a duopoly to a triopoly causes rail rates for corn to 
decline an additional 14.2% at 25 miles from water, an additional 10.1% at 50 miles away, and an 
additional 15.7% at 100 miles from water.
Some studies have focused on the issue of railroad wheat rates in the northern Great Plains states, 
especially Montana and North Dakota. Bitzan et al. (2003) provided insight into inter- and intra-
commodity rail rate differentials observed since rates were deregulated in 1980. The study found 
that the benefits of railroad deregulation were not distributed evenly across or within commodities, 
favoring grain producers in regions with higher levels of intermodal competition.
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The study concluded that as the number of railroads serving a market decreases or that distance 
to the nearest water competition rises, rail rates increase. Thus, states dominated by a single railroad 
and also distant from water competition will have relatively high rail rates.  The authors found that 
the northern, southern, and Central Plains states had higher rail rates than the Eastern Corn Belt.
Koo et al. (1993) examined railroad pricing behavior in shipping grain from North Dakota to 
domestic and export destinations by using an econometric technique with cross sectional data from 
1984 to 1989. The authors found that cost factors play an important role in the variation of rail 
rates; distance, volume, and weight per car all have significant effects on North Dakota rail rates. 
They also observed that North Dakota’s primary grain commodities (wheat and barley) experience 
higher rates than corn and soybeans because wheat and barley are not heavily produced in water 
competitive regions.
Kwon et al. (1994) investigated the ability of railroads to practice differential pricing in a 
competitive and unregulated transportation market. They also measured the determinants of rail 
differential pricing in the Kansas wheat transportation market. Using data from the second half of 
the 1980s the authors found that railroads practice differential pricing in the unregulated Kansas 
wheat transportation market. This is the case for both the intra-Kansas and Kansas export wheat 
transportation markets, although the determinants of railroad differential prices are different in the 
two markets.
In 2007, Montana lawmakers appropriated $3 million for research into rail issues facing 
Montana, including rates and service. Cutler et al. (2009) note that Montana is distant from ports 
and population centers and, combined with the bulk nature of the commodities, means that motor 
carrier intermodal competition is ineffective. Thus, nearly 100% of Montana wheat is shipped by 
rail to the PNW (Pacific Northwest).
Cutler et al. (2009) found that in 2006, Montana and North Dakota wheat shippers paid higher 
average rail rates on a per-car basis and a per-ton basis than wheat shippers in other nearby states. 
They also found that the average revenue to variable cost ratio (R/VC) for Montana wheat shipments 
to the PNW was 253% in 2006, well above the averages for all other states with significant railroad 
wheat shipments.
Marvin Prater et al. (2010) examined the sufficiency of rail rate competition in rural areas and 
the impact of intramodal competition on rail rates. They found that rail competition for grain and 
oilseed shipments generally decreased in the 1988-2007 period. Also, revenue to variable cost ratios 
(R/VC) increased in most CRDs and the ratios were related to the number of railroads competing 
in the CRD.
Recent data are inconclusive on whether North Dakota and Montana wheat rail rates are higher 
than other states. In the 1988-2007 period, Prater et al. (2010) found that in the case of revenue 
per ton, Montana and North Dakota had the smallest increases of the 10 states evaluated. Iowa, 
Nebraska, Kansas, and South Dakota had the largest increases.
For revenue per ton-mile, Colorado, Kansas, Indiana, and Missouri had the largest increases, 
while Montana, North Dakota, and Illinois had the smallest increases.  In fact, North Dakota revenue 
per ton-mile actually decreased in the 1988-2007 period.
For R/VC ratios, the states with the largest increases were Kansas, Missouri, Colorado, and 
Nebraska.  Montana’s R/VC ratio remained virtually unchanged.  North Dakota and Indiana had the 
least increase in R/VC ratios in the 1988-2007 era.
USDA (2013) provided average grain and oilseed tariff rates per ton-mile by state for the 2006-
2010 period for 36 states. The rates ranged from 2.5 cents (South Dakota) to 9.8 cents (Michigan) 
per ton-mile. Montana and North Dakota had rates of 3.3 and 3.4 cents, respectively. Montana had 
the 7th lowest rate and North Dakota had the 8th lowest rate.  The study didn’t supply rates for wheat 
separately.
Babcock et al. (2014) estimated an empirical model of intrarailroad competition involving 
Montana, North Dakota, and Kansas using OLS (robust standard errors) and double log specifications. 
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Equations were estimated for Kansas-Montana data, North Dakota-Kansas data, and the Kansas, 
Montana, and North Dakota data for both estimation methods.
For the Kansas-Montana estimation, the total shipment weight and the distance from Montana 
wheat origins to Portland were the most significant.  Average Montana wheat rail rates were about 
the same as Kansas. For the Kansas-North Dakota estimation, the total shipment weight and the 
distance to Portland from North Dakota wheat origins were the most significant factors. North 
Dakota average rail wheat rates were higher than Kansas average rail wheat rates.
The hypothesis of the study was that the greater intrarail competition in Kansas relative to 
Montana and North Dakota would result in higher railroad wheat prices in Montana and North 
Dakota than Kansas. The hypothesis was confirmed for North Dakota but not for Montana.
MODEL
The model in this study is a variant of the model published in Koo et al. (1993) where equilibrium 
prices of rail transport of agricultural products are determined by the demand for and supply of 
rail service.  The demand for an individual railroad’s service (Qd) is a function of the price of the 
railroad’s service (P1), the price of other railroads’ transport service (P2, P3…), the prices of other 
modes of transport (A1, A2…), and other factors affecting the demand for rail transport (S). Thus, 
the demand function is equation (1).
(1) Qd = f(P1, P2, P3…A1, A2, S)
The supply of a railroad’s service (Qs) is a function of the price of the railroad’s service (P1), 
the price of other modes of transport (A1, A2…), and cost factors such as distance (d), shipment 
volume (v), and other variables that affect the cost of rail transport (C). Thus, the supply function 
is equation (2).
(2) Qs = f(P1…A1, A2, d, v, C)
In equilibrium Qd = Qs so equations (1) and (2) can be combined to form the equilibrium 
condition.  Thus, the equilibrium price equation for railroad (1) is as follows:
(3) P1 = f(P2, P3…,A1, A2, d, v, S, C)
If the prices of other railroads (P2, P3) are defined as intramodal competition (iac) and the prices 
of other modes (A1, A2…) are defined as intermodal competition (ioc), then equation (3) can be 
rewritten as follows:
(4) P1 = f(iac, ioc, d, v, S, C)
The empirical model for this study is based on equation (4).  As discussed above, intermodal 
competition is likely to be minimal for rail shipments of wheat since the shipments are long distance 
movements to domestic processing centers and export ports making truck competition ineffective. 
The average distances from Great Plains origins to barge loading locations is 364.6 miles (Mon-
tana), 381.9 miles (North Dakota), 219.9 miles (Kansas), 276.7 miles (Texas), 214.8 miles (South 
Dakota), and 186.4 miles (Oklahoma).  These distances render barge competition to be minimal to 
nonexistent.
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The only significant source of competition is intrarailroad competition. Thus, the empirical 
model is as follows:
(5) RATE = b0 + b1 CARWT + b2DIST + b3TSW + B4BARGE + b5HHI + e1
RATE – Railroad rate in dollars per ton-mile for the shipment
CARWT – Weight of covered hopper (pounds) 
DIST – Distance in rail miles between origins and destinations
TSW – Total shipment weight (tons)
BARGE – Distance from origins to barge loading locations
HHI – Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
In terms of hypothesis testing, CARWT, the weight of the rail car, is expected to have a negative 
relationship with the change in rail rates per ton-mile (RATE). This is because operating costs such 
as switching cost per car, labor costs, clerical costs, and various other costs are fixed per car, so the 
costs per car decrease as car weight increases. Thus, the change in rail rates per ton-mile falls as car 
weight increases.
The expected sign of the distance between origins and destinations (DIST) is negative.  A 
large amount of railroad costs are fixed with respect to distance such as loading and clerical costs, 
insurance, interest, taxes, and managerial overhead.  As these fixed costs are spread over more 
miles, the costs per mile decrease at a decreasing rate, so the change in rail rate per ton-mile falls as 
distance increases.
The variable for total shipment weight TSW reflects (a) the number of cars in the shipment 
and (b) the tons in the shipment.  Since the empirical model includes the commodity CARWT, the 
weight of the shipment reflects the impact on rail rates of increased cars in the shipment.  Because a 
large share of rail costs are fixed with respect to weight, railroads also realize economies of weight. 
Therefore, the change in rail rates per ton-mile are expected to decrease at a decreasing rate as 
weight per shipment increases.
Next, intermodal competition is proxied by highway miles to barge loading locations. Longer 
distances to water access points reduce the feasibility of truck-barge competition for rail wheat 
shipments. Thus, the theoretically expected sign of BARGE, the distance from origins to barge 
loading locations, is positive since greater distances to water ports are likely to give greater pricing 
power to the railroads. 
Finally, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (sum of squared market shares of each railroad in 
the CRD) is used to measure intrarailroad competition. The higher the index the greater the rail 
market concentration in the CRD. The maximum value of the index is 10,000 when one firm has 
a monopoly in the market. The index approaches zero when a market consists of a large number 
of firms of about equal size.  The theoretically expected sign of the HHI is positive.  As the index 
increases rail market concentration increases, leading to less intrarailroad competition and higher 
railroad wheat transport prices.
DATA
The principal data source for this study is the 2012 Confidential Waybill Sample compiled annually 
by the Surface Transportation Board (STB).  The sample contains shipment data from a stratified 
sample of waybills submitted by freight railroads to the STB.  Data obtained from the Confidential 
Waybill Sample include:
1. Revenue per ton and revenue per ton-mile
2. Rail car code, i.e., C113 is a 268,000-pound loaded covered hopper car, and C114 is a 
286,000-pound fully loaded covered hopper car
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3. Distance in rail miles from origin to destination
4. Origin and destination state
5. Originating and termination railroad
6. Total shipment weight (obtained by multiplying the cars in the shipment by the tons 
shipped)
U.S.D.A. AMS (Agricultural Marketing Service) classified the waybill wheat shipment data for 
the nine states by CRD, which are regions of five to 14 counties. The number of CRDs for the nine 
wheat producing states are as follows:
Idaho  4
Kansas  7
Minnesota  6
Montana  7
North Dakota 9
Oklahoma  5
South Dakota 7
Texas  7
Washington  5
Total   57
USDA AMS personnel also calculated the shortest distance from the center of each CRD to the 
closest barge loading location using GPS.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 12 displays the mean, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum values of the variables. 
The mean car weight is 279,694 pounds with a minimum value of 268,000 and a maximum of 
286,000 pounds. The mean distance of the shipment from origin to destination is 853 miles with 
the minimum and maximum values of 29 and 2,719 miles, respectively. The mean weight of the 
shipment is 385,021 tons with a minimum of 62 tons and a maximum of 1,533,753. For distance 
of origin CRD to the nearest barge loading location, the mean, minimum, and maximum values are 
302, 7, and 552 miles, respectively.  The mean of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index was 7,347 with 
minimum and maximum values of 3,197 and 10,000.
The empirical model was estimated in double log specification (denoted as Ln) and the results 
are displayed in Table 13.  Variables Ln DIST and Ln TSW have the theoretically expected negative 
signs and are highly significant (p value of < .001).  Ln BARGE has the expected positive sign and 
is statistically significant (p value of <.001).  The results for Ln CARWT had an unexpected positive 
sign, but the coefficient was non-significant.  This could be due to a lack of variation in CARWT 
since the model contained only two car weights (268,000 and 286,000 pounds), the only car sizes 
and types for rail wheat shipments.
The results for Ln HHI were surprising since it had an unexpected sign, but the coefficient was 
non-significant.  The non-significance of HHI is likely not due to multicollinearity since the partial 
correlation coefficients with the other explanatory variables are quite low.  The correlation between 
Ln HHI and Ln CARWT, Ln TSW, Ln DIST, and Ln BARGE are 0.179, 0.09, 0.02, and 0.09, 
respectively.  The lack of variation in HHI may have contributed to the lack of significance since 
nearly 40% of the 57 CRDs in the analysis were served by only one railroad.
There is the possibility that intrarailroad competition may no longer be a factor determining the 
level of railroad rates for wheat. The analysis is cross-sectional using data for 2012. It is possible 
that the underlying effect of HHI will be better captured using panel data analysis. This should be 
investigated for the years 2011, 2013, and 2014. In addition, further research should investigate the 
importance of intrarailroad competition in determining railroad rates for corn and soybeans for the 
years 2011 through 2014. 
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Table 14 lists the number of “single carrier” shipments; that is, CRDs served by one Class I 
railroad.  Idaho and North Dakota have the most “single carrier” shipments while Kansas, Minnesota, 
and Texas have the fewest. As indicated previously, the UP has 88.1% of the Idaho Class I rail 
mileage while the BNSF has 78.1% of the North Dakota mileage. In contrast, the UP and BNSF 
have roughly equal shares of the Class I rail miles in Kansas and Texas.  Minnesota is served by four 
Class I railroads and no single railroad has more than 39% of the state rail mileage.
Table 12: Variable Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
RATE 5.764 4.322 0.0323 57.029
CARWT 279,694 8,589 268,000 286,000
DIST 853 443 29 2,719
TSW 385,021 558,852 62 1,533,753
BARGE 302 124 7 552
HHI 7,347 1,997 3,197 10,000
RATE - Revenue per ton mile x100, measured in cents per ton-mile
CARWT - measure in pounds
DIST - measured in miles
TSW - measured in tons
BARGE - measured in miles
HHI – index number, sum of rail squared market shares in a CRD
Table 13: Model Results
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value
Ln CARWT 0.002157 0.08 0.936
Ln DIST -0.0422 -30.52* 0.000
Ln TSW -0.00223 -7.67* 0.000
Ln BARGE 0.00666 4.35* 0.000
Ln HHI 0.00327 -1.18 0.238
Constant 0.324074 0.98 0.328
Observations 2001
F-statistic 243.15
R2 0.38
Root MSE 0.03411
*statistically significant at .01 level 
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Table 14: Number of Shipments from CRDs That Have One Class I Railroad
State Number of Monopoly Shipments Rank of States*
Idaho 128 9
Kansas 0 1
Minnesota 10 2
Montana 21 4
North Dakota 103 8
Oklahoma 36 5
South Dakota 47 6
Texas 11 3
Washington 64 7
*The lower the rank number the greater the intrarailroad competition.  Fewer  
CRDs served by only one railroad.
Previous studies have indicated that the presence of two railroads in a grain transportation 
market results in lower rail transportation rates than a monopoly (MacDonald (1987, 1989a, and 
1989b) and Harbor (2008).  Table 15 indicates that a majority of the CRDs are served by at least 
two Class I railroads.  More specifically, none of the four Idaho CRDs are served by more than one 
Class I railroad but all seven Kansas CRDs are served by at least two Class I railroads.  Four of the 
six Minnesota CRDs have at least two Class I railroads, but only three of the seven Montana CRDs 
have more than one Class I railroad.  Seven of the nine North Dakota CRDs are served by two to 
three Class I railroads, but only three of the five Oklahoma CRDs have this characteristic.  Next, 
five of seven South Dakota CRDs have two to three Class I railroads, and five of the six Texas CRDs 
also have more than one Class I railroad.  Four of the five Washington CRDs are served by a single 
carrier, leaving only one that is served by more than one railroad.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index values (HHI) indicate substantial variation in intrarailroad 
competition within states, although it may no longer be a factor determining rail tariff rates for 
wheat during 2012. Table 16 contains the high and low HHI values of CRDs in each state and a 
percentage difference between them.  Idaho has no variation and Washington only 6.2%.  However, 
the other seven states have very large percentage differences ranging from Oklahoma (87.8%) to 
Minnesota (212.8%). Thus intrarailroad competition within states appears to be significant.
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Table 15: Intrarailroad Competition by State and CRD
State CRD Competing Railroads
Kansas 2010 UP, BNSF, Kyle
Kansas 2020 UP, BNSF
Kansas 2030 BNSF, UP
Kansas 2040 UP, BNSF
Kansas 2050 UP, BNSF
Kansas 2060 BNSF, UP
Kansas 2080 UP, BNSF
Minnesota 2710 BNSF, UP
Minnesota 2740 BNSF, UP, TCWR
Minnesota 2750 CPUS, UP
Minnesota 2760 CPUS, BNSF, UP
Montana 3020 BNSF, CP
Montana 3030 BNSF, CP
Montana 3070 BNSF, UP
North Dakota 3810 BNSF, CPUS
North Dakota 3820 BNSF, CPUS
North Dakota 3830 BNSF, CPUS
North Dakota 3840 BNSF, CPUS
North Dakota 3850 BNSF, CPUS, RRVW
North Dakota 3860 BNSF, CPUS
North Dakota 3890 BNSF, CPUS
Oklahoma 4010 BNSF, UP, ATLT
Oklahoma 4020 UP (ATLT), BNSF
Oklahoma 4030 UP, BNSF
South Dakota 4610 BNSF, CPUS
South Dakota 4620 BNSF, CPUS
South Dakota 4630 BNSF, TCWR, CPUS
South Dakota 4650 BNSF, CPUS
South Dakota 4660 BNSF, CPUS
Texas 4811 BNSF, UP
Texas 4821 BNSF, UP
Texas 4822 BNSF, UP
Texas 4840 BNSF, UP, KCS
Texas 4870 BNSF, KCS
Washington 5330 BNSF, UP
BNSF - Burlington Northern Santa Fe  CPUS - Canadian Pacific (US)
UP - Union Pacific Railroad   RRVW - Red River Valley and Western Railroad
Kyle - Kyle Railroad   ATLT - AT&L Railroad
TCWR - Twin Cities and Western Railroad KCS - Kansas City Southern Railroad
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Table 16: Intrastate Variation in Herfindahl-Hirschman Indexes 
 of Crop Reporting Districts (CRD)
State Low High High-Low % Difference
Idaho 10,000 10,000 0
Kansas 4,839 9,279 91.80%
Minnesota 3,197 10,000 212.80%
Montana 5,008 10,000 99.70%
North Dakota 5,001 10,000 100%
Oklahoma 5,326 10,000 87.80%
South Dakota 3,834 10,000 160.80%
Texas 4,643 10,000 115.40%
Washington 9,417 10,000 6.20%
CONCLUSION
This study examined 2012 rail transportation of wheat in the nine major wheat producing states. 
Potential competition in this market is intramodal (railroad vs railroad) and intermodal (railroad vs 
truck-barge). Truck competition is not effective in this market since the shipments involve relatively 
low value, large shipment sizes, and are shipped over long distances.  The rail networks (and thus 
potential intramodal competition) vary among the nine states.  For example, the railroad network in 
Idaho, Washington, Montana, and North Dakota are largely dominated by a single Class I railroad. 
However, the rail networks of Kansas, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Texas are characterized by a Class 
I duopoly or triopoly of roughly equal size rail firms. The latter group of states would be expected 
to have lower railroad wheat rates than the former group of states due to greater intrarailroad 
competition. Also, potentially intrarailroad competition could vary within states as well.
Intermodal competition could also vary among the nine states since the distance to the nearest 
barge loading location varies by state. For example, Minnesota wheat shippers are closer to barge 
loading locations than Montana shippers.  Thus, the overall objective of the study was to investigate 
railroad pricing behavior for the shipment of wheat. Specific goals were to (1) measure the impact 
on railroad wheat rates of the intensity of intramodal competition, (2) develop a model to measure 
the impact of railroad costs, intrarailroad competition, and intermodal competition on wheat rates in 
the major wheat production states, (3) identify and measure the major cost determinants of railroad 
wheat rates, and (4) examine the hypothesis that railroad intramodal competition varies within a 
state with implications for intrastate variation in railroad wheat rates.
The model was estimated in double log specification. The distance of the shipment from origin 
to destination (DIST) and the total shipment weight (TSW) have the expected negative sign and were 
highly significant. This indicates that rail cost variables have an impact on rail wheat rates, which 
are lower for long distance shipments and total shipment weights (more cars in the train). Distance 
to barge loading locations (BARGE) had the expected positive sign and was highly significant. 
Thus, despite the relatively long distances of most of the nine states from barge loading locations, 
intermodal competition in the form of truck-barge combinations can influence railroad rates.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) had an unexpected sign but was non-significant, 
indicating that intramodal competition was no longer significant in the determination of rail tariff 
rates for wheat during 2012. When the number of shipments from CRDs served by one Class I 
railroad is compared, Idaho and North Dakota have the most “single carrier” shipments while 
Kansas, Minnesota, and Texas have the fewest. Thus, the degree of intrarailroad competition varies 
by state.
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Previous studies have found that the presence of two railroads of roughly equal size in a grain 
transportation market results in lower rail rates.  For wheat, a total of 35 CRDs (61% of the total 
CRDs) are served by at least two Class I railroads.  The presence of intrarailroad competition varies 
by state.  For example, Idaho had no CRDs served by at least two Class I railroads while all seven 
of the Kansas CRDs were served by at least two Class I railroads.
Not only varying among states, the HHIs indicate there is substantial variation of intrarailroad 
competition within states. For example, when comparing the high and low HHI of CRDs in each 
state, it was found that Idaho has no variation and Washington has only a 6.2% difference between 
the high and low HHI.  However, the other seven states have a very large percentage difference in 
HHI ranging from 87.8% (Oklahoma) to 212% (Minnesota). These differences imply that intrarail-
road competition is present within states. 
Overall, the study found that railroad cost factors, such as distance shipped and total shipment 
weight, and intermodal competition are important determinants of 2012 railroad wheat rates. The 
HHIs were not significant, but other evidence implies that intrarailroad competition is present within 
states.
References
Adam, Brian G. and Dale G. Anderson. “Implications of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 for the Level 
and Variability of County Elevator Price Bids.” Proceedings of the Transportation Research Forum 
26(1), (1985): 357-363.
Association of American Railroads.  Railroad Facts.  Washington, D.C., various years.
Babcock, Michael W., L. Orlo Sorenson, Ming H. Chow, and Keith Klindworth.  “Impact of the 
Staggers Rail Act on Agriculture: A Kansas Case Study.”  Proceedings of the Transportation Re-
search Forum 26(1), (1985) 364-372.
Babcock, Michael W., Matthew McKamey, and Phillip Gayle. “State Variation in Railroad Wheat 
Rates.” Journal of the Transportation Research Forum 53 (3), (2014): 83-100. 
Bitzan, John, Kimberly Vachal, Tamara Van Wechel, and Dan Vinge.  The Differential Effects of Rail 
Rate Deregulation: U.S. Corn, Wheat, and Soybean Markets. Upper Great Plains Transportation 
Institute, 2003.
Chow, Ming H.  “Interrail Competition in Rail Grain Rates on the Central Plains.  Proceedings of 
the Transportation Research Forum 27(1), (1986): 164-171.
Cutler, John, Andrew Goldstein, G.W. Fauth III, Thomas Crowley, and Terry Whiteside.  Railroad 
Rates and Services Provided to Montana Shippers: A Report Prepared for the State of Montana, 
2009.
Fuller, Stephen, David Bessler, James MacDonald, and Michael Wolgenant.  “Effects of Deregula-
tion on Export Grain Rail Rates in the Plains and the Corn Belt.”  Proceedings of the Transportation 
Research Forum 28(1), (1987): 160-167.
Gallamore, Robert E., “Regulation and Innovation: Lessons from the American Railroad Indus-
try.”  J.A. Gomez-Ibanez, W.B. Tye, and C. Winston eds.  Essays in Transportation Economics and 
Policy.  Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press (1999): 493-529.
Railroad Wheat Rates
82
Grimm, Curtis M. and Clifford Winston.  “Competition in the Deregulated Railroad Industry: 
Sources, Effects, and Policy Issues.”  Sam Pelzman and Clifford Winston eds.  Deregulation of 
Network Industries, Washington, D.C.: Brooksing Institution Press (2000).
Harbor, Anetra L.  “Competition in the U.S. Railroad Industry: Implications for Corn, Wheat, and 
Soybean Shipments.”  Presented at the 2008 Transportation Research Forum Annual Meeting, Fort 
Worth, Texas, March 2008.
Koo, Won W., Denver D. Tolliver, and John Bitzan.  “Railroad Pricing in Captive Markets: An 
Empirical Study of North Dakota.”  Logistics and Transportation Review 29(2), (1993): 123-137.
Kwon, Yong Woo, Michael W. Babcock, and L. Orlo Sorenson.  “Railroad Differential Pricing in 
Unregulated Transportation Markets: A Kansas Case Study.”  The Logistics and Transportation 
Review 30(3), (1994): 223-244.
MacDonald, James M.  “Competition and Rail Rates for the Shipment of Corn, Soybeans, and 
Wheat.”  Rand Journal of Economics 18(1), (1987): 151-163.
MacDonald, James M.  Effects of Railroad Deregulation on Grain Transportation.  U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, ERS Technical Bulletin No. 1759, Washington D.C., 1989a.
MacDonald, James M.  “Railroad Deregulation, Innovation, and Competition: Effects of the Staggers 
Act on Grain Transportation.”  Journal of Law and Economics 32, (1989b): 63-96.
Prater, Marvin, Ken Casavant, Eric Jessup, Bruce Blanton, Pierre Bahizi, Daniel Nibarger, and Isaac 
Weingram. “Rail Competition Changes Since the Staggers Act.”  Journal of the Transportation 
Research Forum 49(3), (2010): 111-132.
Sparger, Adam and Nick Marathon. Transportation of U.S. Grains: A Modal Share Analysis, 2015. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service. Web. <http://dx.doi.org/10.9752/
ts049.06-2015>
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service.  State Grain Rail Statistical 
Summary.  Washington, D.C.: June, 2013.
Wilson, Wesley W. and William W. Wilson.  “Deregulation, Rate Incentives, and Efficiency in the 
Railroad Market.” B. Starr McMullen ed.  Transportation After Deregulation.  New York: Elsevier 
(2001): 1-24.
Endnotes
1. The Surface Transportation Board (STB) defines Class II railroads as those with operating 
revenue of $37.4 million or more and less than the Class I threshold of $467.1 million. Class III 
railroads are those with operating revenue less than $37.4 million. These thresholds are adjusted 
annually for inflation (AAR, Railroad Facts, 2014, p. 3).
83
JTRF Volume 54 No. 3, Fall 2015
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by Cooperative Agreement Number 14-TMXXX-KS-0026, with the 
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). This 
research project could not have been completed without the assistance and support of many people. 
AMS provided the financial support of the project. Marvin Prater (since retired from AMS) stratified 
the Waybill data that greatly helped the progress of the study and provided valuable guidance 
throughout the project. Personnel at AMS provided the distances from wheat origins to the nearest 
barge loading locations. Bebonchu Atems provided extremely valuable computer technical support. 
Crystal Strauss typed the manuscript.
Disclaimer
The opinions and conclusions expressed do not necessarily represent the views of USDA or AMS.
Michael W. Babcock is a full professor of economics at Kansas State University. In his 43-year 
career at KSU, he has published over 85 articles in professional journals, along with numerous 
monographs and technical reports. His research has been cited in over 75 books, the transportation 
press, and professional journals. He has been principal investigator or co-principal investigator on 
34 federal and state research grants worth $2.3 million.
Babcock has received numerous national awards for his transportation research. He has won 
five	best	paper	awards	from	the	Transportation	Research	Forum	(TRF)	for	outstanding	research	in	
transportation	economics.	He	has	received	the	E.S.	Bagley	award	five	times	from	the	Economics	
Department of KSU for outstanding achievements in transportation economics research. In 1998 he 
was awarded the ISBR Senior Faculty Award for research excellence in The Social and Behavioral 
Sciences from KSU. In 2005, he received the Herbert O. Whitten TRF Service Award (the highest 
honor bestowed by TRF) for professional contributions to TRF, becoming only the eighth person to 
receive the award in the 50-year history of TRF. He has served as general editor of the Journal of 
the Transportation Research Forum since 2000.
Bebonchu Atems	 is	 an	 assistant	 professor	 of	 economics	 and	 financial	 studies	 in	 the	 School	 of	
Business	at	Clarkson	University.	He	is	also	affiliated	with	the	Clarkson	University	Institute	for	a	
Sustainable Environment (ISE).
He received his B.A. in economics from the University of Maryland College Park in 2007, 
and completed his Ph.D. in economics in 2011 from Kansas State University, where he wrote his 
dissertation under the direction of Dr. Lance Bachmeier. He was a visiting professor in the economics 
department at Kansas State University in Fall 2014.
Atems’	research	focuses	on	issues	of	income	inequality,	energy	shocks,	and	fiscal	policy.	Many	
of his papers use U.S. state-level or county-level data and spatial econometric models.  His research 
on energy shocks primarily focuses on how allowing for multidirectional asymmetries in time-series 
models enhances current understanding of the macroeconomic effects of crude oil market shocks. 
His research has appeared in such professional journals as Economic Letters, Journal of Regional 
Science, Empirical Economics, Energy Economics, Applied Economics Letters, American Journal 
of Managed Care, and Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics.
Atems teaches econometrics at the undergraduate level and data mining at the graduate 
level at Clarkson University. He has also taught principles of macroeconomics, principles of 
microeconomics, and intermediate macroeconomics.
84
